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HATE CRIMES, THE DEATH PENALTY, AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM 
 
J. Richard Broughton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal justice reform is all the rage now.  And it knows no party or 
label.  High-profile police-involved deaths, concerns about “mass incarceration,” 
and debates over the scope of substantive criminalization have captured national 
attention.
1
 Congress is considering legislation to reduce the number of crimes 
eligible for mandatory minimum sentences,
2
 the Justice Department has changed 
the way that federal prosecutors charge drug offenses that trigger mandatory 
minimums,
3
 and the President has broadened the use of his clemency powers to 
free dozens of drug offenders from federal prison.
4
  In the debates over criminal 
                                                          
*
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.  I am grateful to the board and staff of 
the Journal for the invitation to participate in the symposium.  I am also grateful to Nadine 
Hammoud and Patrina Bergamo for their excellent research assistance.  
1
 See Alex Altman, Can Congress Pass Criminal Justice Reform ?, Time.com, 
http://time.com/3968149/criminal-justice-reform-congress/ (posted July 22, 2015); Jonathan 
Capehart, Why criminal justice reform might actually happen, WashingtonPost.com, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/07/17/why-criminal-justice-reform-
might-actually-happen (posted July 17, 2015); Anthony Romero & Mark Holden, A New 
Beginning for Criminal Justice Reform, Politico.com, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/a-new-beginning-for-criminal-justice-reform-
119822.html#.VcoLfLUsrkc (posted July 7, 2015).  Cf. Mark Obbie, Last Man Standing, 
Slate.com, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/07/bill_otis_meet_the_last_man_stan
ding_who_thinks_criminal_justice_reform.html (posted July 29, 2015) (highlighting the work of 
Bill Otis in opposing many criminal justice reform measures). 
2
 See Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Effective (SAFE) Justice Act, H.R. 2944, 114
th
 Cong. 
(introduced June 25, 2015). 
3
 See Memorandum of Attorney General Eric Holder to the United States Attorneys and Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division (August 12, 2013) (ordering federal prosecutors not to 
allege drug quantity that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences in certain federal drug 
prosecutions, and to seek alternate ways of avoiding mandatory minimums after receiving 
information that defendant meets criteria for leniency). 
4
 See Sarah Wheaton, President Obama commutes sentences of 46 prisoners, Politico.com, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/obama-commutes-46-prisoner-sentences-
120034.html?hp=b1_r1 (posted July 13, 2015).  
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justice and sentencing “reform,” capital punishment has figured somewhat 
prominently.  Yet an overwhelming dose of the commentary has focused on the 
impending demise of capital punishment, its waning popularity and its declining 
use.   
The headlines are ominous.  “The Death of the Death Penalty: Why the era 
of capital punishment is ending,” read the title of a piece in Time magazine just 
this May.
5
  “Capital Punishment’s Slow Death,” wrote George Will in the 
Washington Post.
6
  Following the decision of the unicameral Nebraska legislature 
to abandon capital punishment in May, even overriding a gubernatorial veto, an 
article in the Washington Post proclaimed, “The death penalty abolition 
movement is not limited to Nebraska,”7 and a piece in Time asked, “Which State 
Will be Next to Abolish the Death Penalty?” (hint: The First State).8  And even 
after the Supreme Court in Glossip v. Gross recently upheld the use of the 
sedative midazolam as an execution drug,
9
 much of the commentary about the 
case focused instead upon Justice Breyer’s provocative dissent questioning the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.
10
   
                                                          
5
 David von Drehle, The Death of the Death Penalty, Time.com, http://time.com/deathpenalty/ 
(posted May 28, 2015). 
6
 George F. Will, Capital Punishment’s Slow Death, WashingtonPost.com, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/capital-punishments-slow-death/2015/05/20/f3c14d32-
fe4f-11e4-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html (posted May 20, 2015). 
7
 Jannel Ross, The death penalty abolition movement is not limited to Nebraska, 
WashingtonPost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/06/01/the-death-
penalty-abolition-movement-is-not-limited-to-nebraska/ (posted June 1, 2015). 
8
 Josh Sanburn, Which State Will Be Next to Abolish the Death Penalty, Time.com, 
http://time.com/3900156/nebraska-death-penalty-repeal/ (posted May 28, 2015). 
9
 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
10
 Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For some of the commentary, see, e.g., David Cole, Justice 
Breyer v. The Death Penalty, NewYorker.com, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/justice-breyer-against-the-death-penalty (posted June 30, 2015); William Baude, Is the Death 
Penalty Unconstitutional?, NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/opinion/is-the-
death-penalty-unconstitutional.html?_r=0 (posted July 7, 2015). 
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So, it would seem that the conversation about criminal justice reform and 
the practice of harsh sentencing does (and probably must) ultimately grapple with 
sentencing for violent crimes.  And it is natural that the death penalty would be 
part of that conversation.  But the death penalty part of it has surely been 
amplified not just by recent events highlighting its shortcomings or public 
opposition – like the Nebraska abolition and the Breyer dissent in Glossip – but 
also by recent and highly-publicized instances of extreme violence that have 
legitimately implicated the option of capital punishment upon conviction.  Boston 
Marathon bomber Dzokhar Tsarnaev was sentenced to death in federal court in 
May of 2015.
11
 James Holmes was convicted in July 2015 for killing twelve 
people during a mass shooting at an Aurora, Colorado movie theatre, and though 
his jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigating factors did not outweigh 
the aggravating factors, it could not agree unanimously on a death sentence, thus 
resulting in a default sentence of life without parole.
12
  Note that rarely does the 
prevailing anti-death penalty narrative tell us what the just and fitting punishment 
should be for defendants like Tsarnaev or Holmes.  And there are plenty of signs 
that even life in prison without parole has become an object of sentencing scorn.
13
  
                                                          
11
 See Milton J. Valencia, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev gets death penalty for placing Marathon bomb, 
BostonGlobe.com, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death-
penalty-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombing/canMEfLmeQJxQ4rFU0sERJ/story.html 
(posted May 15, 2015). 
12
 See Steve Almasy, et al., James Holmes sentenced to life in prison for Colorado movie theatre 
murders, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/07/us/james-holmes-movie-theater-shooting-
jury (posted Aug. 8, 2015).  According to media coverage, the result was a product of a single 
juror who refused to be swayed to impose the death penalty. See Elizabeth Murray, Aurora 
shooting: Juror opens up about sentencing James Holmes to life in prison, Today.com, 
http://www.today.com/news/aurora-shooting-juror-opens-about-sentencing-james-holmes-life-
prison-t37596 (posted Aug. 8, 2015). 
13
 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without parole 
for juvenile homicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment);  Stephen Lurie, The Death Penalty 
Is Cruel.  But So Is Life Without Parole, NewRepublic.com, 
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The most recent case of high-profile mass killing, though, adds a new and 
confounding wrinkle to the narrative.  And like the many other cases of extreme 
mass killing, it further undermines the abolitionist crusade. 
On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof joined the Bible study class at the historic 
Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
14
  There, using a firearm, 
he allegedly shot and killed nine people.
15
  He fled and was captured in North 
Carolina.
16
  According to media reports, Roof not only confessed to the crime, but 
indicated that he committed the killing out of racial animus, which is consistent 
with media reports of statements from survivors who said that Roof shouted racial 
epithets during the killings.
17
  State prosecutors in South Carolina obtained 
multiple indictments against Roof
18
 and are deliberating as to whether to seek the 
death penalty against him under state law.  But then, on July 22, 2015, Attorney 
General Loretta Lynch announced that the federal government had obtained a 33-
count indictment against Roof, charging him with violations of the federal hate 
crimes statute, the federal religious rights obstruction statute, and federal firearms 
statutes.
19
  Because the federal indictment implicates multiple federal capital 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121943/death-row-crueler-and-more-unusual-penalty-
execution (posted June 16, 2015) (discussing conditions of confinement). 
14
 See John Bacon, Dylann Roof indicted in deadly Charleston rampage, USAToday.com, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/07/dylann-roof-indicted--charleston-








 See Indictments, State v. Roof, Docket Nos. 2015-GS-10-04123, 2015-GS-10-04115, 2015-GS-
10-04116, 2015-GS-10-04117, 2015-GS-10-04118, 2015-GS-10-04119, 2015-GS-10-04120, 
2015-GS-10-04121, 2015-GS-10-04122 (Ct. Gen. Sess. July 7, 2015) (all charging defendant with 
murder under South Carolina law).  I note that these are merely indictments and that Roof is 
presumed innocent at this time. 
19
 See Indictment, United States v. Roof, No. 2:15cr472 (D.S.C., July 22, 2015).  Again, this is 
merely an indictment, and Roof is presumed innocent at this time. 
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crimes, the Department of Justice is now weighing whether to seek the death 
penalty against Roof.  Notably, the federal hate crimes prevention statute pursuant 
to which Roof has been charged does not permit the death penalty.
20
  But the 
federal indictment charges him using not just the hate crimes prevention statute 
but also the religious obstruction statute, which provides for capital punishment 
where the relevant conduct causes death,
21
 and with the primary gun enhancement 
statutes – sections 924(c) and (j) – which allow capital punishment where the 
person uses a firearm during a federal crime of violence, resulting in death.
22
   
In terms of electoral influence, the status of the death penalty is 
ambiguous.  It is one thing for journalists, scholars, and commentators to oppose 
the death penalty; it is quite another for a politician to do so, particularly at the 
national level.  It still is not clear that the death penalty will be a major, or even a 
minor, issue in the 2016 national elections.  It has not figured prominently in 
recent ones, at least as a national issue.  But with so much focus on criminal 
justice issues, and with these high-profile cases of mass killing and related capital 
punishment decisions now commanding public attention, it is not unreasonable to 
think that capital punishment could creep into the national electoral universe in 
the coming months and years.
23
  Historically, few politicians could go wrong 
supporting the death penalty.  Now, one cannot be so sure.  Current political 
sensitivities seem to suggest that opposition to – or at least criticism of – capital 
                                                          
20
 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)(B)(i). 
21
 18 U.S.C. § 247(d)(1). 
22
 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j). 
23
 For commentary on this, see, e.g., Scott Lemieux, How a President Hillary Clinton could help 
end the death penalty, TheWeek.com, http://theweek.com/articles/565073/how-president-hillary-
clinton-could-help-end-death-penalty (posted July 8, 2015) (suggesting that Hillary Clinton could 
appoint justices to the Supreme Court who would find the death penalty unconstitutional, whereas 
some Republican candidates could appoint justices who would expand the death penalty). 
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punishment is in fashion, even among some conservatives
24
 (though one would 
think that doing what is fashionable in politics would be antithetical to 
conservatism).  In a world where harsh criminal sentences are under attack, and in 
which support for capital punishment is often publicly portrayed as bizarre or 
ignorant or perverse, how, if at all, is a responsible and prudent political leader 
supposed to discuss and defend capital punishment?  More specifically, in the 
current political environment, can we now justify seeking the death penalty for 
brutal mass killings? 
This short commentary examines the relationship between the federal hate 
crimes prevention law and capital punishment.  It places that relationship in the 
context of modern criminal justice reform rhetoric and uses the Roof prosecution 
as a starting point for evaluating the enforcement of capital punishment with 
respect to a limited category of highly aggravated hate crimes resulting in death. 
II. HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY “POISON PILL” 
 
 Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act in 2009, now codified at section 249 of Title 18.
25
  Although 
                                                          
24
 See, e.g., Will, supra note 6 (describing the conservative case against the death penalty).  There 
is also a website dedicated to this movement.  See Conservatives Concerned About the Death 
Penalty, available at http://conservativesconcerned.org/what-conservatives-are-saying/ (listing 
statements by prominent political figures on the Right questioning the death penalty). 
25
 Written both before and after passage of the bill, a substantial body of scholarship and 
commentary exists on hate crimes laws, much of which debates the wisdom and constitutionality 
of such legislation.  See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER: HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL 
LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES 
UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999); John S. Baker, United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments 
Against “Hate Crimes Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing 
Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 1227 (2000); Kami Chavis Simmons, Subverting Symbolism: The Matthew Shepard and 
James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Cooperative Federalism, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1863 (2012); Matthew Trout, Federalizing Hate: Constitutional and Practical Limitations to the 
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versions of it had been pending in the Congress for years, Congress approved the 
ultimately enacted law as part of the 2010 defense appropriations legislation.
26
  
The law fills gaps created by an existing federal criminal statute that also punishes 
bias-motivated conduct, but that is limited to situations where the victims were 
engaged in certain enumerated federally protected activities.
27
  Unlike the 
federally protected activities statute – section 245 – the hate crimes prevention 
statute does not limit the class of victims in such a way, and eliminates the 
double-intent requirement of the federally protected activities law.
28
  This new 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act was named for Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
whose deaths had become iconic symbols of the extreme violence that can 
sometimes attend personal hatred.   Shepard, a student at the University of 
Wyoming, was beaten, tortured, tied to a fence, and left to die in rural Laramie, 
Wyoming in 1998.
29
  Byrd was abducted in Jasper, Texas by three men who tied 
him to a pick-up truck and dragged him for nearly three miles, severing multiple 
body parts, including his head.
30
   
 The Shepard-Byrd law makes it a distinct federal crime to willfully cause, 
or attempt to cause, bodily injury through the use of fire, firearm, dangerous 
                                                                                                                                                              
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
131 (2015).  While I find this debate fascinating and important, I do not repeat it here.  Rather, I 
take the existing law as I find it (enacted, enforceable, and constitutional), and ask whether and to 
what extent the federal death penalty should apply for certain violations.   
26
 See Pub. L. 111-84, Div. E., 123 Stat.2835 (2009), codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 249. 
27
 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2). 
28
 Id.  (requiring proof that the actor “willfully” injures, intimidates, or interferes with a protected 
person “because of” the person’s race, color, religion, or national origin, and “because of “ the 
person’s participation in the federally protected activity.). 
29
 For additional facts and the resolution of the trial, see James Brooke, Gay Murder Trial Ends 
With Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/06/us/gay-murder-
trial-ends-with-guilty-plea.html (posted April 6, 1999). 
30
 See State v. King, 29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
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weapon, or explosive or incendiary device “because of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, or national origin of any person.”31  The same conduct is 
unlawful where it is done “because of the actual or perceived “religion, national 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person,”32 
where the conduct bears a statutorily defined connection to interstate commerce.
33
  
Congress relied upon the Commerce Clause (and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, where the conduct amounts to state action) for its authority to enact 
the latter provision, but relied upon Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
enact the former provision,
34
 thus dispensing with the need for a connection to 
interstate commerce.  Under either provision, the maximum punishment is ten 
years in prison,
35
 though if death results or the offense includes kidnapping, 
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the maximum punishment is life in 
prison.
36
   
 The absence of a death penalty provision in the statute was no accident or 
oversight.  The original House version of the bill, which passed in April of 2009, 
did not contain a death penalty provision.
37
  During the Senate’s consideration of 
the bill, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama offered an amendment that would have 
included a death penalty.
38
  Senator Sessions remarked at the time that “[i]t would 
                                                          
31
 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). 
32
 Id. § 249 (a)(2)(A). 
33
 Id. § 249(a)(2)(B). 
34
 See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 497-98 (5
th
 Cir. 2014) (explaining constitutional 
bases for the statute). 
35
 18 U.S.C. §§ 249(a)(1) (A) & (a)(2)(A)(i). 
36
 Id. § 249(a)(1)(B) & (a)(2)(A)(ii). 
37
 See H.R. 1913, 111
th
 Cong. (2009). 
38
 See 155 CONG. REC. S7683 (2009) (considering Amendment No. 1615 as modified).  The 
Amendment provided that the defendant “shall be subject to the penalty of death in accordance 
with chapter 228 (if death results from the offense), if – (i) death results from the offense, or (ii) 
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be odd that it would not be possible (to seek the death penalty) and a crime could 
have resulted – easily in multiple murders – by one of the most vicious criminals 
one can imagine.”39  The Sessions amendment passed the Senate, along with a 
series of other amendments, including an amendment offered by Senator Ted 
Kennedy of Massachusetts that would have established specific standards for 
seeking the death penalty in a hate crimes case.
40
  Although Senator Kennedy 
opposed the inclusion of a death penalty, he sought to ensure that if the death 
penalty provision remained, it would have been subjected to exacting scrutiny by 
the Justice Department and federal courts.
41
   
The mere passage of any death penalty provision may seem strange today 
when we consider that Democrats, a substantial number of whom personally 
opposed capital punishment, formed an overwhelming majority in the Senate and 
should have been able to block the amendment.  Interest groups who favored the 
legislation immediately attacked the death penalty provision as a poison pill and 
urged the Congress to ultimately reject it.
42
   One prevalent theory was that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to 
commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill.”  Id. 
39
 Id. at S7686 (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
40
 See id. The Kennedy Amendment (Amendment No. 1614) would have required the Attorney 
General to certify that the defendant was among the “worst of the worst,” as Senator Kennedy 
described it, and would have required federal courts to conduct proportionality review to make 
sure that the case was like other cases where the federal government had sought and received the 
death penalty more than half of the time.  Id. 
41
 See id. at S7684 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that “this amendment adds appropriate 
safeguards in cases where the federal government seeks the ultimate – and irreversible – penalty of 
death,” and that the amendment’s “requirements are a significant improvement over existing 
federal practice in death penalty cases.”). 
42
 See Advocacy Letter to the United States Senate from the Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights, et al., Oppose the Sessions Amendments to the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act, July 20, 2009; Letter to the United States Senate from American Civil Liberties Union, 
ACLU Urges NO Vote on SA 1615 – Sessions Death Penalty Amendment to Hate Crimes 
Amendment in Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1390); Sessions Amendment is Unconstitutional, 
July 20, 2009. 
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amendment was inserted by opponents of the bill with the full knowledge that 
supporters of the legislation would not vote in favor of it as long as it provided for 
the death penalty.
43
  Adding capital punishment to the list of permissible 
sentences would therefore effectively kill the bill.  These groups, and other 
Senators, further attacked the substance of the Sessions amendment, saying that it 
expanded the federal death penalty and was inconsistent with a commitment to 
civil rights.
44
  It is not unreasonable to think, though, that perhaps Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid of Nevada allowed the various amendments to be included 
because he wanted to ensure that the legislation would proceed in the defense 
appropriations bill, knowing that a conference committee ultimately could wipe 
the final bill clean of any amendments that were too controversial.  
 Sure enough, when the bill reached the House-Senate conference 
committee, the death penalty provision was removed and the final version of the 
bill provided that life in prison would be the most severe punishment available.
45
  
 On the one hand, the Roof indictment proves why the Shepard-Byrd Act 
does not require a death penalty provision in order for the federal government to 
pursue the death penalty in a case involving a hate crime.   
Where the defendant commits the bias-motivated murder with a firearm, 
the underlying bias-motivated violence serves as the predicate for the gun 
enhancement.  The defendant uses the firearm during and in relation to a federal 
                                                          
43
 See Editorial, A deadly amendment to the hate-crimes bill, L.A. TIMES, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/07/opinion/ed-hate7 (posted Aug. 7, 2009). 
44
 See 155 CONG. REC. S7695 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); ACLU Letter, supra note 42; 
Press Release, Senate Adopts Death Penalty Amendment to Hate Crimes Provision: Expansion of 
Federal Death Penalty Counter to Furthering Civil Rights, Says ACLU, American Civil Liberties 
Union, July 21, 2009. 
45
 See H.R. CONF. REP. 111-288, at 1002 (2009). 
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“crime of violence,”46 which is the hate crime.  Ironically, then, although 
opponents of the Sessions Amendment (and the death penalty more generally) 
opposed using the death penalty for a hate crime, that is the practical effect of 
seeking the death penalty under the section 924(c) and (j) enhancements where 
the hate crime serves as the violent crime predicate.  Moreover, the conduct that 
the statute prohibits is sufficiently narrow (requiring “fire, firearm, dangerous 
weapon, or explosive or incendiary device”) that anyone engaged in the kind of 
conduct that would implicate the hate crimes law would also very often implicate 
another federal law targeting such conduct that does provide for capital 
punishment – such as section 924(c) or section 844(d) or (i), which permits capital 
punishment where death results from certain conduct related to fire, explosives 
and incendiary devices.
47
  The federal prosecution of Roof, should it go forward, 
is therefore an effort to vindicate not just the federal interest in punishing bias-
motivated conduct, but also the federal interest in punishing gun violence. 
But the Sessions Amendment need not be thought of as a mere poison pill.  
There was an underlying good faith basis for including a death penalty provision 
in the Shepard-Byrd bill, one that still exists. 
What if the perpetrator of a hate crime, for example, does not use a 
firearm?  What if, instead, the hate crime perpetrator stabs his victims to death, 
attacks them with a machete, or beats them to death with a baseball bat, out of 
pure animus?  Under those circumstances, the firearm enhancements under 
sections 924(c) and (j) would not apply.  And although the government could, 
                                                          
46
 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
47
 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d), (i). 
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under some circumstances, seek the death penalty using the religious obstruction 
statute (which is alleged in the Roof indictment, because the alleged crime took 
place in a church Bible study),
48
 that statute (unlike section 249(a)), requires proof 
that the conduct occurred in or affected interstate commerce.
49
  It is as yet unclear 
what the federal government’s interstate commerce theory is with respect to Roof, 
but it is not hard to imagine a case in which the interstate commerce element 
would be very difficult to prove, even if the animus was comparatively easy to 
prove.  And the Roof case just happens to be a case in which the alleged racial 
animus and obstruction of religious exercise overlap; that will not always, or even 
often, be the case.  What if the conduct does not occur in a church, but in a private 
home or on the street?  Of course, the Shepard-Byrd law also requires that the 
weapon be a “dangerous weapon,” and perhaps there is some question as to 
whether a weapon that is not a firearm or explosive would satisfy that element of 
the statute in the first place. But assuming that it did, and no other federal capital 
offense applied, the federal government would be without a death penalty option, 
even if the perpetrator committed a highly aggravated killing that would 
otherwise implicate the federal death penalty. 
 Also, contrary to the claims made by groups like the ACLU during 
consideration of the Sessions Amendment, allowing a capital punishment option 
is entirely consistent with federal criminal law in the area of civil rights.  Almost 
every one of the major civil rights deprivation statutes in Title 18 that address 
violent conduct provides for the death penalty.  Sections 241 (conspiracy against 
                                                          
48
 See Indictment, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
49
 See 18 U.S.C. § 247(d). 
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rights), 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law), 245 (federally protected 
activities) and 247 (interference with religious exercise) all provide for the 
possibility of capital punishment where death results from the underlying 
conduct.
50
  Amending Section 249 to include a death penalty provision would 
therefore bring it into line with these other civil rights laws.  So when civil rights 
advocacy groups opposed the Sessions amendment in 2009 by saying that it was 
inconsistent with a commitment to civil rights,
51
 that may have been true with 
respect to the particular viewpoints of those groups, but it was not true with 
respect to the federal criminal laws protecting civil rights, as those laws 
overwhelmingly favor the option of a death penalty.  And because the hate crimes 
statute is existing law, amending the legislation now to include a death penalty 
provision would not serve as a poison pill the way the Sessions Amendment 
arguably did in 2009.  
 Consider, moreover, the James Byrd case.  Although the State of Texas, 
and not the federal government, prosecuted the case, it is instructive for purposes 
of the death penalty debate.  Two of Byrd’s assailants – Brewer and King – 
received well-deserved death sentences.
52
  Yet the three men who kidnapped Byrd 
                                                          
50
 See 18 U.S.C. § 241; Id. § 242; Id. § 245(b); Id. § 247(d)(1).  Among the statutes in Chapter 13 
of Title 18 that deal with violent conduct, only 18 U.S.C. § 248 – which protects freedom of 
access to reproductive clinics – does not have a death penalty provision (other than section 249). 
These civil rights statutes also provide for the death penalty in cases kidnapping and aggravated 
sexual abuse, without a resulting death, but those death penalty provisions would be invalid under 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  Notice, supra note 42, that the Sessions Amendment 
would have applied to these situations only where death results.  And in any event, the Federal 
Death Penalty Act requires that a death result from the conduct except where the crime is treason 
or espionage or certain drug kingpin activity.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a) & (b). 
51
 See, e.g., ACLU Press Release, supra note 44. 
52
 Lawrence Russell Brewer was executed in 2011; John William King awaits execution on 
Texas’s death row; Shawn Berry was sentenced to life in prison.  See Associated Press, White 
Supremacist Gang Member Executed for Dragging Texas Man, FoxNews.com, 
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and dragged his body to the point of decapitation never used a firearm, nor did 
they interfere with or obstruct Byrd’s free exercise of religion nor did they 
interfere with or intimidate Byrd with respect to the exercise of any federally 
protected activity.  So while it was obviously unnecessary for the federal 
government to act in order to obtain a death sentence for Byrd’s killers, the same 
would be true with respect to Roof or any other defendant who commits his 
offense in a death penalty jurisdiction and is otherwise death-eligible under state 
law.  And yet if the federal government’s argument for pursuing Roof is that it 
must vindicate its interest in punishing violence based on racial animus, the same 
would have been true with respect to Byrd, as his killers were prosecuted pursuant 
to Texas capital murder law and not a law directed specifically at punishing racial 
animus.   
Still, even if Congress lacks the will to amend section 249 to include a 
death penalty provision to cover a limited universe of violent hate-motivated 
killings that fall outside of the scope of other federal capital offenses, another 
option exists.  Congress could at least amend section 3592(b)’s list of statutory 
aggravating factors to include killings based on the types of animus described in 
the hate crimes statute.  Other jurisdictions have enacted similar aggravators in 
their capital murder laws.
53
  Even now, the government could theoretically allege 
racial animus as a non-statutory aggravating factor.  But non-statutory aggravators 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/21/white-supremacist-gang-member-executed-for-dragging-
texas-man/ (posted Sept. 21, 2011). 
53
 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(n); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 200.033(11). 
               Vol. 37.1 199 
are not eligibility factors.
54
  Adding a provision for killings that are the product of 
animus based on race, religion, national origin, gender, disability, or sexual 
orientation would enable the government to use such animus not just as a ground 
for aggravating the crime, but also as a ground for making the defendant death-
eligible.  And by making it a statutory aggravating factor that is different from 
other aggravators related to the commission of the offense, such a change would 
further serve to strengthen the government’s stated interest in punishing animus-
based violence by giving animus its own distinct place among aggravators.  
Moreover, adding the Shepard-Byrd list of punishable animus would be consistent 
with the Federal Death Penalty’s Act’s scheme of aggravation in general, as it 
includes other statutory aggravators that specifically relate to the motivations of 
the defendant (such as committing the killing for payment or with the expectation 
of receiving some other pecuniary gain).
55
 
Of course, even having a federal death penalty available – whether as a 
part of the Shepard-Byrd Act or simply by using other capital offense statutes – 
does not mean that the federal government must seek the death penalty, even in a 
highly aggravated case.  As the Roof case could demonstrate, the willingness of 
states to prosecute – and perhaps seek the death penalty – under their own laws 
functions as a limit on federal power generally, and on its capital prosecution 
power specifically.  The Justice Department’s Petite Policy requires the federal 
government to forego prosecution if the parallel state prosecution would leave the 
                                                          
54
 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).  See also United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 
325 (5
th
 Cir. 2007) (holding that under federal law, non-statutory aggravators cannot be used to 
determine eligibility). 
55
 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(c)(7), (8). 
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federal interest “demonstrably unvindicated.”56  The Shepard-Byrd Act even 
codifies to a substantial extent the Department’s underlying policy.57  There is 
some chance that the federal government will form an agreement with South 
Carolina that the United States will be first to prosecute the case, thus avoiding 
serious Petite questions (as happened in the Tsarnaev prosecution).  But in cases 
where parallel state and federal prosecutions are contemplated, the federal 
government should not consider its interests “unvindicated” merely because the 
state law basis for prosecution is different from the federal law basis.  For 
example, in Roof’s case, would the federal interest be left unvindicated merely 
because South Carolina uses capital murder law rather than a bias-motivated 
violence prohibition?  That, of course, would be the basis for pursuing a federal 
punishment even if South Carolina prosecutes, convicts, and punishes Roof.
58
  
But the relevant inquiry should be whether the underlying state prosecution 
results in just and appropriate punishment for the conduct that is relevant to the 
federal interest, not whether the State uses a statutory scheme similar to that of the 
federal government.  This also means, however, that in the event that a state 
prosecution did not result in a death sentence, a federal capital prosecution would 
still be appropriate because the non-capital sentence would not demonstrably 
vindicate the federal interest.  This is why a federal capital prosecution in the 
Tsarnaev case would have been appropriate in any event: because Massachusetts 
could not impose the death penalty upon Tsarnaev.  So whether the State proceeds 
                                                          
56
 See United States Attorneys Manual 9-2.031.A. 
57
 See 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1). 
58
 The aforementioned certification provision of the Shepard-Byrd Act specifically states that the 
particular interest left “demonstrably unvindicated” is the federal interest in “eradicating bias-
motivated violence.”  Id. 
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under its own laws, and whether it seeks the death penalty, will be additional 
factors that constrain federal decision-making. 
III. DEFENDING A LIMITED AND EFFECTIVE DEATH 
PENALTY IN A SEASON OF DOUBT 
 
 Of course, a more fundamental objection to my modest proposal may be 
this: why expand the scope of the federal death penalty at a time when the death 
penalty is, according to many, becoming increasingly unpopular and, if Justice 
Breyer’s Glossip dissent is to be believed, is of dubious constitutionality?  The 
answer is that the premises of this objection are highly questionable, if not 
entirely wrong, and should not deter the enforcement of a constitutionally 
permissible and limited, yet effective, death penalty.  After all, criminal justice 
reform need not be exclusively about protecting the interests of defendants and 
prisoners.  And my proposal would hardly work a meaningful expansion of the 
federal death penalty – it could be used only in a limited category of especially 
aggravated cases where personal animus motivated a killing.   
 So despite the persistent narrative claiming the death penalty’s decline in 
popularity as well as its questionable wisdom and constitutional validity, let me 
suggest a contrary narrative.  The current naysayers notwithstanding, the prudent 
politician – not callous or bloodthirsty, but motivated by a sense of justice, 
proportionality, and equilibrium in the social order – has a sensible defense of 
capital punishment.  In especially serious and aggravated cases, where evidence 
of guilt is strong and the defendant has acted with no justification or excuse, the 
death penalty should at least be available as an option for criminal juries.  This 
does not mean mandatory death penalties or even that prosecutors should seek 
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death for many, or most, murders.  It means simply that, on atypical occasions, a 
set of facts may occur that show a crime so aggravated, so brutal or harmful, with 
guilt so clear and mitigation so minimal, that a sentence of less than death may 
not be fitting for the crime and only the death penalty can serve as appropriate 
moral desert.  Under those circumstances, a fair and impartial jury – comprised of 
citizens who are capable of, but not predisposed to, imposing the death penalty – 
should at least have the option of doing so. 
 Moreover, the mere imposition of capital punishment does not offend the 
Constitution, the text of which explicitly recognizes the existence of capital 
punishment and sets forth the procedures for inflicting it.
59
  Others have 
adequately answered the constitutional questions that Justice Breyer raises in his 
Glossip dissent.
60
  Justices Scalia and Thomas, in particular, separately offered 
compelling explanations in Glossip for why the death penalty remains 
constitutionally permissible and why, moreover, it is not the Court’s place to 
advocate its abolition.
61
  I cannot improve upon these other constitutional 
defenses of the death penalty.  I merely offer the following observations, which 
amplify certain points raised in the Scalia and Thomas concurrences.  First, to 
establish that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional, one must bear the 
burden of establishing that there are no cases – no set of facts, no matter how 
                                                          
59
 See U.S. CONST. AMEND V (referring to any “capital or otherwise infamous crime” and to the 
rule that no person “shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”).  I 
do not suggest that the mere contemplation of the death penalty in the constitutional text is 
sufficient for upholding its infliction in all cases.  Rather, its place in the text is a critical factor is 
determining whether it is constitutionally appropriate in any case. 
60
 See Baude, supra note 10.  See also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (explaining death penalty’s constitutionality, in response to Justice Stevens). 
61
 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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brutal, heinous, or aggravated; and no evidence, no matter how overwhelming in 
demonstrating the defendant’s guilt – for which a sentencer should ever have even 
the option of considering a death sentence.  It is difficult, to the point of nearly 
impossible, to imagine that the Constitution takes that position.  And second, if 
we are to consider whether the Constitution takes that position, then we must also 
consider whether the American people hold such a view.  I am confident that they 
do not, and will not in the foreseeable future. 
 The second point requires some additional clarification.  I have never been 
particularly fond of using public opinion polling, or other mass summaries of 
public sentiment, as a sufficient justification for advocating or opposing any 
specific public policy.  Political leaders should seek not to vindicate public 
sentiment for its own sake, but to refine it, and then perhaps vindicate it or reject 
it, through sound reasoning and good judgment.
62
   Sometimes public opinion 
polling will be a useful guide on a particular issue.  But sometimes polling cannot 
reasonably be expected to capture the nuance and complexity of a given matter, 
even where respondents are sincere in their belief that they are offering 
appropriate guidance through their answers.  And sometimes the poll itself is 
simply useless.  Nonetheless, in a world in which the death penalty is routinely 
described as anathema to contemporary values, and where Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence by its own terms seeks to discern those values in determining the 
                                                          
62
 Recall Madison’s observation in Federalist No. 10 that representatives in a republic should 
“refine and enlarge the public view.”  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 
1964) (James Madison). 
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validity of a particular sentencing practice,
63
 I reluctantly confess that public 
opinion polling on the death penalty has its (limited) place.  This is especially so 
if we are to question whether it remains consistent with contemporary standards 
of morality, which is the relevant question for purposes of determining its 
constitutionality per se.  And a quick, admittedly unscientific, review of recent 
polling suggests that the death penalty remains popular nationwide,
64
 even if 
unpopular in certain locales.       
 Moreover, the public opinion polling may actually understate popular 
support for the death penalty in a given case.  The Gallup and Pew polls are good 
examples of why this may be so.  The question is whether the respondent was in 
favor of or opposed to the death penalty “for a person convicted of murder.”65  
But, of course, that question does not reflect the reality of capital punishment law 
– no jurisdiction imposes the death penalty for all murder simpliciter, nor should 
it – nor does it give the respondent any facts upon which to make a moral 
judgment about the propriety of the death penalty for the particular offense and 
offender, as opposed to another punishment, such as life without parole.  Even so, 
less than half of respondents in the Gallup Poll chose life without parole when 
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 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion) (“we look to objective indicia 
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”). 
64
 According to Gallup, 60% of respondents in May 2015 said that the death penalty was morally 
acceptable, and in October 2014, 63% said they favored the death penalty “for a person convicted 
of murder.” Gallup Poll on the Death Penalty, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx.  The Pew Research Center’s national polling 
from April 2015 shows support for the death penalty at 56%, compared to 38% opposed.  See Less 
Support for Death Penalty, Especially Among Democrats, Pew Research Center, available at 
http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/16/less-support-for-death-penalty-especially-among-
democrats/ (posted April 16, 2015).  Again, the question was whether the respondent favored or 
opposed the death penalty “for persons convicted of murder.” Id.   
65
 Id.; Pew Poll April 2016, supra note 64. 
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given the choice, while half chose the death penalty.
66
  Imagine, though, the 
outcome of the polling if it presented the question the way that capital decision-
makers must face it.  Polls about specific cases (like Tsarnaev or Holmes) get us 
closer to this kind of more meaningful inquiry.  Consider also, for example, what 
the response might be if respondents were told that, regardless of the facts, 
regardless of the brutality of the crime or the number of victims, and regardless of 
the strength of the evidence against the defendant that proves his or her guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, under no circumstances should a person ever receive 
the death penalty for aggravated murder.  I doubt that the responses to such a 
variation would decrease the death penalty’s favorability.  Whatever legitimate 
reservations the public may have about innocence, mistake, or even the 
sometimes ugly business of executions, the public also likely understands that so 
long as there are people who are willing to intentionally set off bombs at major 
sporting events, kill mass numbers of children in schools or movie-goers in a 
theatre, kill police officers in the line of duty, or kill while serving in prison 
(including while serving life sentences)
67
 or kill entire groups of people out of 
sheer racial hatred – capital punishment should remain at least available as a 
sentencing option in these narrow circumstances, despite the risks it may present.  
Perhaps what the polling should seek to establish, then, is whether Americans 
                                                          
66
 See Gallup Poll, supra note 64. 
67
 It is said that this is rare.  See Equal Justice USA, Fact Sheet, Executions and Prison Safety?, 
available at http://ejusa.org/learn/prison%20killings (last visited July 15, 2015) (stating that 
“prison murder overall is extremely rare”).  Perhaps so.  But the question, as with other questions 
of just punishment, is not whether the act is rare or frequent.  Nor is the question whether the death 
penalty is a deterrent to prison killings, or whether inmates serving life have incentives to behave 
well in prison.  The question is how, when the act occurs, the actor should be punished.  Without a 
death penalty, a prisoner serving life without parole cannot, as a practical matter, receive an 
effective punishment if he or she kills in prison. 
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favor a limited and effective death penalty, one in which prosecutors and jurors 
reserve death penalty decisions only for a small category of highly aggravated 
cases and where there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the sentence will be 
finalized if it is imposed.
68
 
 One might, however, note that the trends are what matters, and support for 
capital punishment is trending downward.
69
  But even if we assumed that the 
death penalty was decreasingly popular, the trends in public sentiment do not 
spell its doom.  After all, according to Gallup, even though the death penalty’s 
popularity was at its height during the 1990s, it had climbed there – to 80% in 
September 1994 – from numbers below 50% in the 1960s and 1970s.70  So even if 
one accepts the debatable narrative that the polling demonstrates that the death 
penalty is declining in popularity, so much so that the American people are 
turning their backs on it, one must remember that the death penalty has been far 
less popular than it is now, only to substantially increase in popularity again over 
time.  
 Of course, trends remain important in any conversation about the stability 
of public sentiment.  And trending now is a conservative movement to question 
the death penalty.  No offense to my friends on the political Left, but more Liberal 
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 Of course, enforcing a truly limited death penalty means entrusting capital prosecutors with 
discretion in doing so.  Justice Breyer rightly notes that prosecutorial discretion can sometimes 
create risks that the death penalty will be sought in cases for which it is arguably not appropriate, 
or, conversely, that it may not be sought by some prosecutors when prosecutors in another 
jurisdiction would seek it.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2763-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  That is a 
matter for another essay, perhaps, but it is sufficient here to note that, despite concerns about the 
scope of prosecutorial discretion in our system, there are ways to impose rational constraints on 
prosecutors in potential capital cases.   And in any event, such discretion among prosecutors is 
hardly adequate for announcing a blanket rule that no prosecutor may ever seek the death penalty. 
69
 See Gallup Poll, supra note 64. 
70
 Id. 
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angst about capital punishment is unlikely to move the needle.  The biggest 
political threat to the death penalty, rather, comes from the Right.  Increasingly, 
conservatives – a once reliable group in favor of capital punishment – are 
rethinking their support.
71
  But the “conservative” case against the death penalty 
is no stronger than the traditional “Liberal” one.  Indeed, it is much the same, 
though it is cloaked in the rhetoric of limited (or a kind of libertarian skepticism 
of) government.      
 The “conservative case” has perhaps its strongest and most credible voice 
in George Will.  In recent commentary, Will posits that the “conservative case” 
against capital punishment has three main components.
72
  First, “the power to 
inflict death cloaks the government with a majesty and pretense of infallibility 
discordant with conservatism.”73  Second, he argues, “when capital punishment is 
inflicted, it cannot later be corrected because of new evidence, so a capital 
punishment regime must be administered with extraordinary competence.”74  But, 
Will says, capital punishment is yet another government program, and the practice 
of imposing capital punishment has been demonstrably incompetent because more 
than 140 people since 1973 have been released from death row.
75
  And third, 
“administration of death sentences is so sporadic and protracted that their power 
to deter is attenuated.”76  To exacerbate this problem, Will notes, judicial 
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 See Leon Neyfakh, The conservative case against the death penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, available 
at https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/05/24/the-conservative-case-against-death-
penalty/6NsOMqKbpJeIVMlynelCIM/story.html (posted May 25, 2014). 
72
 See Will, supra note 6. 
73
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regulation of the death penalty is “here to stay.”77  Will’s eloquence is always 
appealing, and few would question his conservative bone fides.  Will, then, is a 
force with which to be reckoned on this matter.  But Bill Otis has properly 
reckoned with Will’s commentary.78  I will not repeat all of Otis’s excellent 
rejoinder, except to recommend it.  Rather, I offer a few additional observations 
(many of which may fall under the general heading of “what’s so great about life 
without parole?”). 
 First, the power to inflict death does not “cloak the government with a 
majesty and pretense of infallibility” any more than does the power to inflict life 
sentences without parole, or life sentences with parole, or, indeed, the power to 
prosecute in the first place.  Will does not explain why seeking and imposing 
death sentences suddenly turns the government into something that it is not when 
it engages in any other prosecutorial or sentencing practice.  Second, there is no 
question that the potential risk of executing an innocent person weighs heavily 
against the infliction of the death penalty in the first instance.  In this sense, Will 
therefore conveys a meaningful concern, and one that capital punishment 
supporters ought to take seriously, though one that hardly belongs exclusively to 
conservatism. Rather, Will makes the concern about innocence the province of 
conservatism by tying it to broader concerns about the competence of 
government.
79
  Yet Will offers no insight as to the proper punishment for a person 




 See Bill Otis, George Will’s Limp Case Against the Death Penalty, Crime & Consequences 
Blog, available at http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2015/05/george-wills-limp-
case-against.html (posted May 21, 2015). 
79
 Cf.  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 186 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (responding to claims 
about innocence and the death penalty). 
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– like, for example, Tsarnaev or Holmes or Timothy McVeigh – whose guilt is 
not in question.  Nor does he make clear why the highest level of government 
competence would not also be desirable in other areas where agents of the state 
are permitted to kill (in war, or where a law enforcement agent kills in self-
defense), or even when inflicting life without parole or some other severe 
sentence in the absence of a capital punishment regime.
80
  Finally, Will’s third 
point relies entirely upon deterrence as the penological justification for capital 
punishment.  It is unclear what is distinctly conservative about preferring 
deterrence theory, as opposed to theories of retribution or incapacitation.  But 
even if it could be demonstrated beyond rational argument that the death penalty 
does not deter (and that has not yet happened, as Otis’s response makes clear),81 
the penological goals of retribution and incapacitation could justify the continued 
use of capital punishment.
82
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 Will seems to be saying that the risk of an innocent person dying at the hands of the state 
requires a kind of competence that a government program like capital punishment cannot offer.  
But again, why is capital punishment unique in this sense?  Fallibility exists throughout the system 
– including among those who operate prisons – and as cases like that of Timothy Cole case show, 
the risks to innocent life are not necessarily unique to capital sentencing.  See Texan who died in 
prison cleared of rape conviction, CNN.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/06/texas.exoneration/ (posted Feb. 6, 2009).  Cole was 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for a 1985 rape in Lubbock, Texas.  He died in prison in 
1999, of heart complications caused by asthma. In 2009, his conviction was formally reversed 
when it was learned that DNA evidence established his innocence and another man, Jerry Johnson, 
confessed to the rape for which Cole was convicted.  Even if Cole was not formally executed, he 
nonetheless died at the hands of the state, in a prison where the state wrongfully placed him upon 
conviction.  Cole later received a posthumous pardon by Texas Governor Rick Perry.   
81
 See Otis, supra note 78. 
82
 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  For a conservative’s affirmation of this conclusion, see Baze v. 
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 90 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Even if we assume 
arguendo that Will would favor a regime of life or life without parole, what would he say about 
the power of those sentences to deter?  If Tsarnaev’s horrific crime was “especially difficult to 
deter,” as Will says, then surely that would be true even if he faced only life without parole and 
not the death penalty (indeed, that is precisely what he will face under state law if Massachusetts 
prosecutors make good on their promise to prosecute him). 
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 I suppose conservative abolitionists may be successful in selling some of 
their arguments – including the arguments about budgets and costs, which Will 
does not make, though other conservatives have).
83
  And yet none of them appear 
to examine the costs of alternatives like life without parole, or even life with 
parole, in a system without capital punishment – after all, once cost is framed as a 
reason for abolition, the question is not how much the death penalty costs 
compared to life in prison; the question is how much life in prison costs compared 
to the other, less severe alternatives. But now that a greater light appears to be 
shining upon life without parole sentences – which used to be distinguished solely 
on the ground that “death is different,” a notion that is disintegrating84 – 
conservatives who want to sell opposition to the death penalty must be prepared 
to play by the same rules in selling the alternative of life without parole. 
 Of course, to the extent that Will questions the effectiveness of the death 
penalty because its administration is “sporadic and protracted,”85 Will is correct.  
But this is not an argument against capital punishment; it is an argument against 
having a death penalty without any intention of actually bringing it to finality. 
 The abolitionist effort to kill capital punishment through discrete litigation 
victories has, of course, failed to achieve actual abolition, but has worked to 
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 See, e.g., S.E. Cupp, The conservative case against the death penalty, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/conservative-case-death-penalty-article-
1.1781639  (posted May 6, 2014) (stating that the death penalty is not cost-effective); Mary Kate 
Cary, The Conservative Case Against the Death Penalty, USNews.com, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/30/the-conservative-case-against-the-death-
penalty (posted March 30, 2011) (listing various death penalty costs and asking whether the 
money could be better spent). 
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 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  Both of 
these decisions began incorporating into non-capital cases involving life without parole an Eighth 
Amendment methodology previously reserved only for death penalty cases.  See Rachel E. 
Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the 
Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009). 
85
 See Will, supra note 6. 
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substantially limit the government’s ability to use capital punishment by imposing 
greater constitutional restrictions upon it.
86
  With respect to executions (as 
opposed to substantive death penalty law and capital trial procedures), the 
litigation strategy has failed rather spectacularly, including most recently in 
Glossip, which expressly declined to question the validity of the Court’s prior 
decisions on execution methods.
87
  As the Glossip Court noted, the state must 
have a constitutionally acceptable way of carrying out a lawfully imposed 
criminal sentence,
88
 whether that is the death penalty or something else.  And as 
several states have shown, the effort to kill the death penalty through drug 
unavailability will likely backfire, for where there is a political will to impose the 
death penalty, the state will find a way to carry out the sentence.
89
   So it is not 
constitutional litigation that poses the most serious contemporary threat to a 
state’s chosen method of execution.  Rather, it is will, or the absence thereof.  
Death penalty jurisdictions cannot simultaneously champion the constitutional 
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 See J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital Punishment, 58 FLA. L. REV. 639, 642-
43 (2006). 
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 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33.  See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (upholding 
firing squad); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding electrocution); Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding three-drug lethal injection protocol). 
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 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47). 
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 Oklahoma (its use of midazolam was at issue in Glossip), for example, has already moved to 
implement the use of nitrogen gas as an alternative method of execution. See Josh Sanburn, The 
Dawn of a New Form of Capital Punishment, Time.com, http://time.com/3749879/nitrogen-gas-
execution-oklahoma-lethal-injection/ (updated posting April 17, 2015).  And though not 
universally popular even among death penalty supporters, other states have given serious 
consideration to the firing squad as an alternative method (Utah approved it as an alternate method 
earlier in 2015) See Mark Berman, Utah governor signs bill making firing squads the state’s 
backup execution option, WashingtonPost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/03/23/utah-governor-signs-bill-making-firing-squads-the-states-backup-
execution-option/ (posted March 23, 2015); Mark Berman & Robert Barnes, Everything you need 
to know about executions in the United States, WashingtonPost.com, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/05/01/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-executions-in-the-united-states/ (posted May 1, 2014). 
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validity of modern execution methods while also permitting, actively or passively, 
interminable delays in carrying out death sentences. 
 This, and the defeat of the theory advanced by the challengers in Glossip, 
should be a lesson for states that have repeatedly refused to bring death sentences 
to finality.  The federal court ruling in Jones v. Chappell – that California’s death 
penalty was unconstitutional because of inordinate delays in carrying out 
executions
90
 – was badly flawed, both on the merits and on other procedural 
grounds, and its prompt reversal would be welcome news.
91
  But Jones at least 
had the virtue of functionally offering the following practical advice to California 
and other states: if you do not want to carry out the death penalty, abolish it.  
Having a death penalty means accepting a regime of extraordinary process for 
establishing the accuracy of guilt and the legality of one’s conviction and 
sentence, but it also requires a willingness to bring death sentences to finality, 
tragic as that decision and that moment may be.  Neither the Eighth Amendment, 
nor any other provision of the Constitution, insulates us from all of the tragedies 
of political life.
92
  And controlling the people through the criminal law often 
requires difficult choices, some of which will involve life and death.  The 
outcome in Glossip, while certainly significant in the world of capital punishment 
supporters,
93
 means very little in places where the state lacks the political will to 
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carry the sentence to finality.  So although neither the federal government nor any 
other state must have a death penalty, where it has one, the punishment must be 
more than just symbolic. 
 One may object that even an effective sentence of life without parole is 
not symbolic.  It is real punishment that the prisoner must endure, even if the state 
never executes him.  Of course that is true, as far as it goes.  But the same would 
be true if we effectively sentenced the defendant to fifty years rather than life; or 
twenty years; or a week.  Each of those would constitute real punishments in 
some sense of the term.  But they would not be the punishment that the political 
community, acting through the capital sentencing jury, has determined to be just, 
appropriate, and fitted to the defendant’s crime.  In that sense, anything other than 
an effective (that is, actually imposed) death penalty makes the imposition of the 
death sentence merely symbolic, for it does not achieve the purposes for which it 
was sought and upon which it was deliberated and decided.  A merely symbolic 
death penalty is the same as no death penalty at all.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Some criminal justice reforms have their merit.  And even the death 
penalty’s supporters must admit that capital punishment is no less deserving of 
reform than many other aspects of the criminal justice system.  But criminal 
justice reform need not always be about reducing criminal sentences – sometimes 
it can also be about protecting the government’s ability to impose especially 
severe sentences in the limited universe of cases where they are justified.  Prudent 
prosecutors and political leaders can still sensibly maintain that the death penalty 
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is not only constitutional but desirable in a narrow class of highly aggravated 
cases where evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the government possesses the 
will to carry out the punishment.  It is reasonable, then, to include a death penalty 
provision in the Shepard-Byrd law, or at least to add hate-crime-type animus to 
the list of statutory aggravating factors in the Federal Death Penalty Act.  Federal 
legislation already recognizes the heightened moral culpability of one who 
commits violence based on animus.  It is not much of a stretch to say that a death 
penalty should at least be an option for killers who engage in extreme violence 
that is aggravated by that same animus.  Consequently, prosecutors and political 
leaders should not fear supporting a death penalty, even in light of the current 
narrative that tries to establish the death penalty’s unpopularity and illegitimacy.  
A sensible case still exists for a just, limited, and effective regime of capital 
punishment.  Prosecutors and political leaders should continue to find a way to 
make that case as part of a more comprehensive criminal justice reform narrative. 
 
